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Issues Affecting Trade and Investment
in Non-Fuel Minerals
Guy F. Erb*
W E ARE WITNESSING a difficult transition from a period
in which control over mineral trade and investment resided
mainly in the major industrialized nations and the firms domiciled
there to one in which governments of producing countries will ex-
ert considerable influence over mineral trade and investment.
New relationships are emerging that reflect the attempts by min-
eral endowed countries to influence the use of their resources. Their
political-economic objectives bring them into conflict with the cus-
tomary policies of industrialized countries, which hitherto have as-
sumed that reliance on market forces will yield the greatest re-
turns to producers and consumers of minerals and metals.
Much of the present conflict between producers and consum-
ers of raw materials centers on who will wield influence over the
development and trade of these products. The main actors in the
present controversy are:
1. Mineral companies that produce, process, and market min-
erals and metals;
2. Merchant firms, brokers, exporters, and importers that
trade in metals, but do not produce them;
3. Private financial institutions, such as banks and insurance
companies, that provide much of the financing for mining proj-
ects;
4. Producing countries, that is, the governments of the coun-
tries whose territories contain the minerals in question;
5. Consuming countries, that is, the governments of nations
which import the raw or processed materials. They take an ac-
tive interest in negotiations between producing companies and
mineral endowed countries, intervene at times in investment dis-
putes, and provide insurance or guarantees for the overseas opera-
tions of their companies; and,
6. Multilateral financial institutions; for example, the World
Bank Group and the regional development banks, that may play an
increasing role in future mineral development.
* MSC. (Econ) 1963, London School of Economics; B.A. 1961, Univ. of California,
Berkeley; Foreign Service Officer, 1963-1971; presently Senior Fellow, Overseas
Development Council.
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Mining and metals firms are in the forefront of the confronta-
tion over mineral production and trade. In part they are in this
exposed position because the considerable investments that are
needed to bring new mines into operation have acted as a sub-
stantial barrier to potential new entrants into the industry. The
resultant industrial concentration and the preponderance of the in-
dustrialized country interests in mineral and metal operations
now motivate producing countries to take collective actions on
price and other issues, and to alter, bilaterally or unilaterally,
their contractual arrangements with mineral companies.
The bargains between countries and companies are clearly
changing. This article considers two factors which underlie these
changes: 1) The ways in which mineral endowed countries have
sought new mineral arrangements with companies; and, 2) the
joint actions taken by producers of minerals and metals.
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES AND COMPANIES
The frequency with which mineral endowed countries, and other
nations with significant foreign investments, have reopened nego-
tiations on contracts has given rise to the concept of the obsolesc-
ing bargain.1  Over time, and particularly in cases where opera-
tions require large investments, countries have sought new
arrangements and have obtained significant changes in their
contracts with foreign firms. The large capital requirements of
petroleum and mining operations originally gave companies a
strong hand in their negotiations with mineral countries which
then had little or no prospect of raising the sums necessary.
Once the investments were in place, however, bargaining power
shifted toward the countries because the companies had a large
stake in continuing operations, even under altered contractual
arrangements. The process has gone furthest in the petroleum
industry, but hard rock mining and other raw materials companies
have come under increasing pressure from host countries.
Changing Contracts. There has been a slow and often difficult
movement away from the types of concessions and leases which
governed mineral production and trade during the colonial and
immediate post-colonial period. The "traditional concessions"
were largely supplanted by "modern concessions" and now "pro-
duction sharing, service, and work contracts"2 are increasing in
I R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY Ch. 2 (1968).
2 D. N. Smith & L. T. Welles, Jr., lineral .Arecnts in l)evelpinn (onn-
tries: Structures and Substance, 69 AM. J. INr'L L. 56) (1975).
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number. Traditional concessions usually included extensive rights
to the concessionaire to exploit one or more natural resources.
Royalties were the main instrument used to calculate payments
made to governments. By the 1950's, income taxes had increased
in importance, and later, other changes were introduced to stimu-
late "linkages" between mineral extraction and other parts of
the host country's economy. 3
The traditional concession has given way in many instances to
more complex, modern concessions due to desires of producing
countries to (1) increase government participation in the owner-
ship of mining operations, and (2) expand the government's
management role. The modern concessions thus include equity
sharing arrangements of various types and government attempts
to exercise some management control or surveillance over corpo-
rate management decisions. In some cases, after nationalization
has given complete control to governments, management contracts
which govern day-to-day operations have been signed with foreign
firms .4
Other forms of agreements have arisen in which foreign enter-
prises have no equity in the mining facilities. The government of
a mineral producing country may purchase the services of corpora-
tions which, holding no ownership interest in the producing entity,
thus act as contractors. "Production sharing agreements" is the
term used to describe arrangements under which foreign com-
panies and the government of a mineral producing country share
a mine's output. The term also refers to arrangements whereby
the company or the government may receive benefits in kind
rather than through cash payments. This type of arrangement has
been most common in the oil industry. Its use is expected to
increase in other areas, including non-fuel mineral industries, al-
though mineral companies will probably try to resist their wide-
spread use.
Modification of old concessions and the introduction of new
forms of mining and marketing arrangements have changed min-
eral bargains. Fixed royalties per ton have given way to complex
mineral arrangements including stipulations on such issues as loan
to equity ratios, plant capacity, employment and training require-
ments, and other conditions that aim at increasing the multiplier
effect of mineral investments in the economy of the host coun-
try.
3 Id. at 566-572.
4 Id. at 572-581.
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Revisions of incentives for mineral development are also
underway in many countries. In Ireland, for example, a policy
of tax incentives to encourage exploration and mining was es-
tablished in 1960. The prospect of a 20 year tax holiday en-
couraged many companies to invest and some large mineral
operations were set up. In 1973, a change of government brought
about an increase in economic nationalism. That factor, plus the
rise in world mineral prices, led to a change in the terms of min-
eral contracts. New tax arrangements introduced a 4.5 percent
profits tax, a corporate tax of 50 percent (no tax holiday is pro-
vided), the government purchase of 25 percent of equity and the
surrender to the state of 10 percent of mineral reserves. The
total impact of this new policy is equivalent to a tax of about 62
percent on profits; a substantial increase over past practices,
but still less than the originally intended British tax take from
North Sea oil operations (about 73 percent).,
In other instances, exploration rights have been separated
from production rights, a practice which has been resisted by
mineral companies who feel that their best and most profitable
contribution to development of mineral resources will be made
through the combined application of their exploration and produc-
tion capabilities. Other innovations in mineral arrangements
have recently included variable royalties which increase as prices
rise, allowing the government to take all returns above an agreed
rate for the mineral company. 6 In effect, mineral countries are
using a variety of measures to gain a larger share of the economic
rent from a project - that is, any difference between the market
price and the operating costs plus a certain profit.
The major impact of mine nationalizations and bargaining
initiatives by host countries has been to call attention to additional
risks in mineral investment. Development of mineral deposits
is costly. Frequently investments run into hundreds of millions
of dollars for a single operation and complex financial and legal
arrangements between companies, banks and other financial
institutions, and countries are necessary. Those who finance
mineral development see new projects offering good potential
returns but containing important elements of risk. Increasing
demands on mineral companies, while possibly improving returns
5 Industry interviews. (The author wishes to keep specific sources confi-
dential.)
6 See C. J. Lipton, Fiscal Aspects of Negotiating Third World Minerals
Contracts, paper presented at the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Insti-
tute of Mining, Metallurgical and Petroleum Engineers, Feb. 18, 1975.
[Vol. 8: 429
NON-FUEL MINERALS
to the host country, can worsen the climate for substantial new
investments there and in other countries which are regarded as
likely to introduce similar changes in mining agreements. Thus
governments with control over mineral deposits face a choice
between policies which aim at maximizing the return from min-
eral development, but which may discourage investments in ex-
ploration and mining, and policies - including measures
enhancing investment security - which offer adequate returns
to the companies which have the capital, technology, and mar-
keting contacts that contribute to successful mineral operations.
Without adequate new investments, there may be inadequate
supplies of essential minerals in the years ahead, a situation
which could cause price instability of the sort experienced in
1973-1975. Thus mining companies, financial institutions, and
governments of producing and consuming countries all have an
interest in mutually satisfactory and stable returns from mining
arrangements. The conditions of ownership, management, and
investment security must be agreed by all parties if they are to
provide a satisfactory framework for mineral development.
The Costs of Mineral Development. The inflation which has
gripped the world economy has had a particularly severe impact
on mineral development. Mineral projects, which were initiated
in the early 1970's, have experienced rising costs which add
enormously to total expenditures. For example, the cost of a
nickel refinery expansion in the United States was initially esti-
mated at $24 million. Construction began in 1973 with a revised
price tag of $33 million and the project was completed in 1975 at
a total cost of $40 million, a 66 percent increase. In another
case, equipment construction costs of a U.S. copper refinery
were estimated at $111 million in 1973. As the project neared
completion, total costs were forecast at $190 million, more than a
70 percent increase. Development of a large nickel project in
Southeast Asia has seen initial cost estimates of $650 million rise
to $820 million. In 1 year, total costs of this project increased 26
percent, while the first stage costs rose by about 60 percent from
late 1973 to late 1975. Another nickel project in Central Ameri-
ca showed a 27 percent cost increase over a recent 18 month
period.'
The large increases in the costs of equipment, materials, and
services related to mineral development that have taken place
during the 1970's, particularly since 1973, have considerably raised
7 Industry intervicws.
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the capital required per annual ton of production capacity. For
example, the cost of copper per annual ton of production in 1973
was about $3,000; it is now estimated at about $6,500. Over a
longer period, from 1965 to 1975, the capital required for iron ore
production rose from $20 per annual ton to $200 per annual ton.8
These price increases have far exceeded the expectations of
mineral producing companies and the financial institutions
upon which they depend for a large part of the resources required
for mineral development. Companies now face the prospect of
a siuwlc project placing significant demands upon funds available
for investment within the company and of increased dependence
on loans for project financing. There is concern that as infla-
tion alters the climate for investment, bankers may require new
forms of security; whereas, in the past, they may have been
satisfied with "take or pay" contracts or floor price contracts
with purchasers of a mine's output. Inflation has also given
pause to companies that in the past might have been prepared to
give completion guarantees to lending institutions. The rise in
costs of mineral development has led to increasingly complex
arrangements for mining investments involving syndicates of
banks, international financial institutions, export credit agencies
of developed countries, mineral companies, and host govern-
nients. The aims of the latter for training, housing, and other
social aspects of a project, plus the impact on total costs of re-
quirements for infrastructure in a developing country, add to the
didficulties in arranging satisfactory financial packages. The
difficulties in raising the capital necessary for mineral develop-
ment projects will hinder the ability of companies to meet the
concerns of mineral holding countries.
From the point of view of countries with mineral deposits,
the impact of inflation on development costs has also made it
more difficult to raise the funds necessary for national participa-
tion in the ownership of a project. They face problems in con-
vincing banks of their creditworthiness and the search for new
forms of security is a prime concern of those seeking greater min-
eral production.
Factors Affecting the Creditworthiness oj Aineral Countries. The
earnings of most raw materials exporters and hence, their credit-
worthiness, are highly dependent upon the business cycle in
developed areas. Mineral exports have relatively low price elas-
ticities of demand and, in the short run, low supply elasticities as
Industry interviews.
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well. Thus, mineral exporters benefited greatly from the in-
crease in demand during the 1973-1974 boom and, at this writing,
they are suffering markedly from the downturn in economic ac-
tivity in the industrialized world and its effects on demand for
non-fuel minerals.
It had been widely assumed in 1973-1974 that mineral pro-
ducers faced better demand prospects for their products than
many other raw materials suppliers. Consequently, it was felt
initially that they could ride out the relatively unfavorable situa-
tion in which the developing world as a whole found itself as
the recession made itself felt. The slowness of economic re-
covery, low prices for minerals and metals, and the concern over
economic and political risks which appeared to reduce new in-
vestments in mineral production has tempered that optimism. A
tendency to cut back on foreign operations by some international
banks and corporations also has had its impact on mineral pro-
ducers. Many mineral development projects and expansions of
existing operations are planned. 9  But delays, cancellations, or
postponements are frequent, and the large capital outlays neces-
sary for new mineral projects have not been forthcoming in many
cases.
The unfavorable debt situation and poor business climate has
made mineral corporations and private financial institutions un-
certain about new investments in developing areas. The external
debt of principal mineral exporters (excluding OPEC members)
was $47.2 billion in 1973.1 One major mineral producer, Zaire,
was in arrears on interest payments for its medium and long-
term international credits. The sharp drop in copper prices was
cited as an important factor in the decline in Zaire's export
earnings and consequent debt problems."
Questions have been raised about the sustainable level of
private lending to developing countries. A cutback of interna-
tional private financial transfers may further depress growth
prospects, adding to business uncertainties. In the present cli-
mate, developing countries seeking to develop mineral deposits
will be subject to close scrutiny as regards their future credit-
worthiness and growth prospects. In the recent past, only a few
have had notable access to Eurocurrency markets. Among the
group of principal mineral exporters (excluding OPEC mem-
9 International Alining Survey, MINING MAGAZINE, Sept. 1975, at 185-221.
10 World Bank, Annual Report, 1975, at 81.
11 AMERICAN METAL MARKET, Oct. 10, 1975.
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bers) only Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and the Philippines received
substantial Eurocurrency credits in 1973-1974: Their total bor-
rowings amounted to $7.4 billion. Ten other mineral exporters
received less than $1 billion and the bulk of those credits went to
three countries, Jamaica, Zaire, and Zambia.12
In 1975, the above four countries received significant Euro-
currency credits. In addition, Malaysia borrowed $225 million. 13
At first glance, these and the earlier credits may seem to indicate
a positive overall assessment of the creditworthiness of this group
of countries. The record of most of the developing countries is
good and no doubt contributed to their continued access to credit.
But in a recession or in periods when the dollar has declined in
value the market in industrialized countries for credits has
diminished, prompting international banks to seek borrowers in
developing areas. Moreover, it has been suggested that some
developing countries are "meeting their interest payments only by
borrowing more money." 14 Thus, factors may have been at work
during recent months which could have given a misleading im-
pression about the state of many countries' debt servicing capacity.
An upturn in their export earnings is critical to ensuring their
sustained creditworthiness.
Ensuring Investment in New Production. In discussions on the
means of financing new mining projects, corporate leaders and
6fficial policy makers in industrialized countries emphasize the
benefits which the efficient operations of a market economy bring
to producers and consumers. Developing country representatives
are often more willing to resort to government intervention as a
counterweight to the disadvantages that they see in market un-
certainties and concentration of market power in industrialized
countries. Leaders of developing nations may see the support of
market forces by leaders of industrialized nations as a means to
guarantee foreign private interests freedom to act without refer-
ence to the objectives of host countries, rather than the freedom to
create a competitive and efficient market system.
These disagreements form a backdrop to the actions taken by
mineral countries to obtain more favorable arrangements with
mining companies. Together they have clouded the investment
outlook for non-fuel minerals. While differing views about the
12 World Bank, Borrowing in International Capital Markets, Second Quarter
1975, at 48.
13 IMF Survey, Feb. 16, 1976, at 106.
14 M. Mayer, Banking: Good Money on Bad Loans, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1975,
at 106, col. 6.
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foreign activities of private corporations can often be overcome
once talks between companies and governments begin on specific
issues, the negotiations themselves pose difficult policy choices
for mining corporations. In those cases where large investments
have already been made, renegotiation with the host countries has
often been the only alternative. For example, in October 1974,
the Government of Papua New Guinea renegotiated the terms of a
1967 copper arrangement with Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia.
A 1967- agreement had given the company a tax "holiday" until
1976, special depreciation provisions, and a privileged legal posi-
tion. In addition to withdrawing these special concessions,
Papua New Guinea also made arrangements for increasing its
share of copper mining profits as those profits increased.is
The prospect of such negotiations, or the knowledge that new
forms of contractual arrangements will be required before mineral
development is allowed to proceed, led some commentators to
conclude in 1975 that mineral exploration is no longer a feasible
venture in developing nations or in Australia, Ireland, and certain
provinces in Canada.16 They attributed the declines in new in-
vestment, not only to the recession and continuing inflation, but
also to the insistence on deals by host governments, which might
reduce the returns to companies from successful mining opera-
tions. Since relatively high profits from a few projects have
usually been the bases for further exploration and development,
the absence of adequate returns is often cited as a major obstacle
to adequate development of new sources of supply of non-fuel
minerals.
It should not be assumed that greater use of joint ventures,
service contracts and other forms of mineral arrangements will
necessarily reduce the profit margins of mineral companies. 17
Company/government negotiations will require some adaptation
by companies - for example, through use of accelerated deprecia-
tion rather than reliance on tax holidays - but both sides will
continue to seek an adequate share of the returns from hard rock
mining. Even major changes in company/country relationships
can apparently result in arrangements that are satisfactory to the
mining companies concerned. 18  Successful multinational enter-
'- Industry interviews.
16 Changes in the Governments of Australia on Dec. 13, 1975 and British (olumbia
on Dec. 11, 1975 were observed with considerable interest by the mineral indus-
try.
See 1). J. Lipton, supra note 6, at 20.
For a detailed elaboration of this point, see C. F. Bergstcn, T. Moran,
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prises are by nature "highly flexible" and pragmatic resolutions
of the conflicts between countries and companies over contractual
arrangements are certainly more likely than a cessation of new
investments.19
In response to new demands by mineral countries, some
companies have greatly increased exploration and development
in "safe" nations such as the United States. Exploration and
development of the seabed is another possibility for certain min-
erals. But not all companies can turn toward the United States,
nor do many have the technical capacity to look to the seabed as a
source of minerals in anything but the long term. For many
firms there will be no alternative to further development of min-
eral resources on foreign dry land; and, for most consuming na-
tions, this will remain the short to medium term source of critical
minerals. Thus, despite the difficulties of negotiating with min-
eral countries and the hesitancy of private financial institutions,
many private investments are currently planned for African, Asian,
and Latin American countries as well as the more developed na-
tions. Their development will depend on public and private ef-
forts to ensure adequate capital investments.
For their part, the developing host countries have powerful
incentives to seek new bargains with mineral companies. Inter-
national discussions on commodity policies are time consuming
and offer direct benefits to only a few non-fuel minerals. 2° In
the short run, greater returns from national mineral development
may be the principal option open to a mineral country, a situation
which could lead countries to compromise on certain issues.
Meeting the concerns of private companies and financial
institutions may require support from developed-country agencies
and multilateral development banks. The United States Govern-
ment has suggested one means of providing such support. At the
Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in Sep-
tember 1975, it called for a major expansion of the activities of the
World Bank and its affiliates in the financing of raw materials
and R. Horst, U.S. District Investment in Foreign Natural Resource Development, in
AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS Ch. V (to be published by
the Brookings Institution, 1976).
19 See, e.g., Corporate Metamorphosis: The Case of Multinational Resource Com-
pany, in FREEDOM AND CHANGE, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LESTER B. PEARSON 215
(I. Litvak and C. Maule eds. 1975).
2o See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
An Integrated Programme for Commodities: Specific Proposals for Decision and Ac-
tion by Governments, TD/B/C.1/193, Oct. 28, 1975; and Measures for Individual
Commodities, TD/B/C.1/194, Oct. 1, 1975.
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development in developing countries. The United States has pro-
posed that these institutions supply limited amounts of capital
directly and use their technical, managerial, and financial ex-
pertise to bring together funds from private and public sources.
Thus, the World Bank group would act as an intermediary be-
tween private investors and host governments, and would link
private and public investors by providing cross guarantees on per-
formance. World Bank loans would also fund government proj-
ects, particularly for infrastructure. The International Finance
Corporation (IFC) would join private firms in providing loans
and equity capital. The United States proposed that the World
Bank group should help mobilize $2 billion in private and public
capital annually for raw materials development.21
Although there is no substitute for viable contractual relation-
ships which both host countries and mineral companies fird
mutually satisfactory, the U.S. proposal may help surmount some
of the problems in this area. One hundred percent mine owner-
ship by private investors is increasingly infrequent and, in any
event, neither mine ownership nor substantial equity now provide
adequate guarantees for many investors. The security provided by
long-run purchase contracts has also been questioned given the re-
cent impact of the recession on several such contracts, in the copper
and iron ore trade, for example. The participation of the World
Bank, or a regional development bank, in a project's financing
arrangements may help satisfy a private investor's concerns about
security and also allow the host government the national sover-
eignty over mineral development that it wishes. The multilateral
institutions may begin to act as catalysts in bringing together
private and official financial institutions in consortia for raw ma-
terials and mineral projects. The role of multilateral agencies
may also facilitate access by developing-country governments or
state enterprises to capital markets in industrialized areas. How-
ever, both host countries and private industry may be reluctant
to accept the conditions which an international agency may seek
to apply before it enters a project. Since such an agency would
21 The Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly's Seventh Special Ses-
sion (U.N. Document A/10232, Sept. 24, 1975) calls for the World Bank Group
to supplement its development financing with private capital in ventures suit-
able to the national plans and priorities of developing nations. It has also rec-
ommended increasing the, capital of the World Bank. The U.S. recommended
an increase in the capital of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and
the creation of an international investment trust to increase investment in local
enterprises and guarantee those investments with a loss-reserve and the Resolu-
tion calls for the consideration of this proposal.
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probably provide only a relatively small share of the total invest-
ment necessary for a mineral project, conditions on financial
arrangements, the return expected from a project, and operational
issues would have to be tempered to reflect its proportion of
total project financing.
The consuming countries' interest in adequate and reasonably
priced supplies of minerals and other raw materials can combine
with the private sector's desire to reduce investment risks.
National systems of investment insurance, for example, have
played a role in many projects. The diminished share in equity
held by developed-country interests has begun to alter the way in
which such institutions have underwritten risks, and some will
cover loans as well as equity operations. In the United States, its
insurance organization, the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration (OPIC) has diminished its coverage of mining projects
relative to the practices of the previous program (managed by
the Agency for International Development). OPIC is facing a
further change as the increased participation of private insurance
which was stipulated by Congress comes into effect. Another
means of obtaining the necessary finance which has been used in
the petroleum and natural gas industries is to introduce consumers
of the product to the financing of a project. In effect, such con-
sumers would pay in advance for the desired mineral, thus con-
tributing an important portion of a project's total costs. Such a
procedure will work best when the minerals in question are facing
strong demand: Panama has recently sought acceptance by banks
of future copper purchases as partial security for loans to a large
copper project. Apparently the proposal has not proved entirely
satisfactory, and banks are reportedly seeking government guaran-
tees of the loans as well.22
For private mining firms, investment decisions depend on
several critical elements: Ownership of mineral development
projects, the control a firm can exercise over management, who
will bear financial and technical risks, and how the financial
benefits from a mining operation are to be shared. These con-
cerns can only be partially met by innovations in project financ-
ing. A willingness to consider alternatives to past practices and
constructive efforts to reach new forms of arrangements by both
companies and host countries will be indispensable to the future
financing and development of non-fuel minerals.
22 Report Panama is Offering Copper Futures to Back Loans, AMERICAN METAL
MARKET, Dec. 9, 1975.
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ACTIONS BY PRODUCERS AND EXPORTERS OF NON-FUEL MINERALS
The changes in ground rules that producing countries have
sought in mining arrangements and the separate, but related, in-
ternational commodity discussions are sometimes said to pit the
advocates of the free market system against an "interventionist
school" which "would create a complex system of indexed prices,
commodity arrangements, governmental trading corporations, and
government-run or controlled corporations to produce raw ma-
terials. "23  This view of the controversy implies that prices of
minerals and other raw materials have, in the past, moved solely
in response to the free play of market forces. In fact, world prices
of commodities often result from the pricing policies of major
international firms.24 Prices of mineral ores and concentrates
may be based on internal company transfer price decisions or
on changes in the companies' production costs.3 Before we ex-
amine the actions of mineral countries, whose "producer power"
figured in the headlines of 1973-1974, a brief description is there-
fore appropriate of actions taken by private firms.
Company Policies. Although individual companies do compete
actively for sales and sources of non-fuel minerals, the industry
as a whole is one in which "purely competitive" markets are rela-
tively minor channels through which minerals and metals enter
world commerce. Other channels have included vertically inte-
grated firms which encompass mining, processing, and marketing
operations; cartels comprised of private or state enterprises; bi-
lateral trading arrangements between governments - using state
trading enterprises or private firms as agents; multilateral com-
modity arrangements; and public and private monopolies. In-
fluence over mineral industries has usually been concentrated in
developed areas: For example, the ownership and management of
the aluminum, cobalt, copper, diamond, iron ore, lead, magnesium,
nickel, tungsten, and zinc industries in the past have been largely
based on private companies from industrialized nations.2 How-
ever, government involvement in such industries, whether through
23 Statement of the Honorable William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury,
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., Oct. 22,
1975, at 11, 13.
2A Harald B. Malmgren, The Raw Material and Commodity Controversy, Inter-
national Economic Studies Institute (Washington, D.C.), Contemporary Issues
No. 1, Oct. 1975, at 14-15.
25 Hendrik S. Hoethakker, Global Resources in an Interdependent World, report
to the International Chamber of Commerce, 25th Congress, June 12, 1975, at 7.
S. D. Krasner, Structuring International Raw Materials Markets, in THE
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nationalization of facilities or establishment of wholly or partially
government-owned enterprises has, in recent years, altered this
situation. To illustrate, in the aluminum industry, governments
(of both developed and developing countries) owned over 9 per-
cent of the 1974 smelting capacity. Estimates for the period
1975-1979 project government ownership of 30 percent of the new
smelting capacity to be installed during those years. 27
In some industries, price leadership by individual firms has
resulted in industry-wide adjustments in prices. Minerals and
metals are standard products which are sold according to common
specifications. Under these circumstances, competing com-
panies experience strong pressures to quote prices which are simi-
lar to those set by price leaders. To illustrate, an industry-wide
price of nickel (the "producer price") is set by a few large cor-
porations in response to the industry's costs of production and the
price incentives judged necessary to stimulate new capacity. Thus
nickel stocks held by producing firms increased and the "pro-
ducer price" rose by 36 percent between April 1974 and Septem-
ber 1975, during a recession which caused declines in other raw
materials prices. 28  Other metals whose prices are more respon-
sive to "industry-wide changes in productions costs" than to
"supply and demand factors" include steel, aluminum, molybde-
num, and magnesium. 29 In such cases, the price may reflect
the short-run cost situation of firms in highly concentrated in-
dustries. Supply and demand influences may make themselves
felt over the longer-run, for example, through diffusion of owner-
ship. In the aluminum industry new companies, some with sig-
nificant government participation, have brought new competitive
pressures on existing companies, particularly in certain interna-
tional markets for aluminum products.
Prices of other metals, such as copper, lead, zinc, tin, and
silver, experience much wider fluctuations. These metals are
traded on the London Metals Exchange (LME) and two -
copper and silver - are also traded on U.S. metals exchanges
where speculative trading in futures contracts is large. These
products are much more subject to supply and demand pressures
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES (G. and L. Garvey eds., to be pub-
lished in 1977).
27 Industry interviews.
28 Data obtained from World Bank, Commodities and Export Projections
Division.
29 The "producer price" commonly reported is that of the International
Nickel Company of Canada, Ltd. (INCO).
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in the short-run, including those from speculators, than the first
group of metals? °
The LME is a "thin" market; that is, one in which volumes
traded are small relative to world production and trade. The
LME often covers only a fraction of total trade in the products
in question. Outside the LME, direct supply contracts between
producing companies or state enterprises and consumers account
for most transactions. However, the prices registered on the LME
exercise great influence over outside sales contracts of copper and
other metals. The LME's daily quotations determine the prices
obtained by many producers, a practice which has been opposed
by some industry figures since in depressed periods (such as 1975),
LME prices may be insufficient to cover costs of many existing
mines. Such low prices also discourage the new investments
needed to ensure an adequate supply when business conditions im-
prove .31
The volatility of copper markets is said to distort the patterns
of supply and demand, putting buyers and sellers at a disad-
vantage compared to those who deal in competing products, such
as aluminum, whose prices are much more stable.32 One copper
industry spokesman has called for an orderly market in which
producers would set a price that would enable production to
continue and make new investments attractive. 33  This and
similar calls echo the concerns a generation ago of Lord Keynes
about the adverse impact of wide fluctuations on output of raw
materials. In 1942, Keynes stated that, under conditions of wide
price fluctuations, "an orderly program of output, either of the raw
materials themselves or of their manufactured products is not
possible." "The whole world," he said "is now conscious of the
grave consequences of this defect in the international competitive
system. "34
Lead and zinc producing companies have, with mixed results,
attempted to limit LME price fluctuations through support of
30 Simon D. Strauss, Executive Vice President, ASARCO Incorporated,
presentation before the American Mining Congress, San Francisco, California,
Sept. 30, 1975.
31 See remarks of J. E. Thompson, President, Newmont Mining Corporation,
reported in the Financial Times (London), Oct. 21, 1975.
32 The Financial Times (London), Oct. 21, 1975, at 23; The Financial Times
(London), Oct. 27, 1975 at 19.
33 THE EcONOMIST, Nov. 2, 1974, at 74-75.
34 J. M. Keynes, The International Control of Raw Materials, 4 J. OF INT'L ECON.
299 (1974).
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producer prices. These prices are used in direct supply contracts
and also guide prices of ore concentrates. The companies have
agreed to maintain a "European producer price" for zinc. This
price, set by the producing companies has shown a considerably
smaller range of price fluctuations than the LME price. To
avoid price cuts in 1975, zinc producing companies agreed to cut
back production, and after "unofficial consultations," they also set
aside funds which were used to purchase excess supplies on the
LME which would otherwise put downward pressure on the pro-
ducer price. At this writing, they have successfully implemented
both policies: Zinc producers agreed to a further increase in the
European producer price in November 1975, following the October
announcement of the price rise by a major producer. Lead pro-
ducing companies had earlier tried and failed to implement a
similar producer price policy.35
As can be seen from the zinc example, maintaining a producer
price requires producing company/consumer relationships that
can survive the temptations that downward fluctuations on metals
exchanges present to consumers who might divert their purchases
away from the producing firms to merchant companies. There must
also be a willingness on the part of producing companies to cut
back production and employ financial reserves that are suffi-
cient to support extensive buying of excess metals, if necessary.
The relative stability of the producer price, which may remain
below metal exchange quotations for considerable periods, pro-
vides an incentive to consumers to go along with such a system.
Actions by Minerals Countries. Recently, the upsurge in raw
materials prices, the success of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and a desire to exert countervail-
ing power in their foreign economic relations has again led raw
materials exporting countries to band together. Formation of
producers and exporters associations has received a great deal of
attention in developed countries due to concern that they might
be harbingers of widespread cartelization of commodities mar-
kets36  This section examines mineral country policies so that
'3 The Financial Times (London), Oct. 21, 1975, at 26.
36 Reviews of the various producer associations are found in EIGHT MIN-
ERAL CARTELS: THE NEW CHALLENGE TO INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS (K. W. Clar-
field, S. Jackson, J. Keefee, M. A. Noble, A. P. Ryan eds. 1975); Interna-
tional Commodity Agreements, A Report to the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission to the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on
Finance, United States Senate, Russell B. Long, Chairman, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., 3 (1975); Bureau of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Special Report No. 4,
R. Mikesell, International Collusive Action in World Markets for Non-fuel Minerals.
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the characteristics and possible impact of their actions can be
assessed.
A cartel is a grouping which is formally organized to achieve
or maintain a price through joint actions. To succeed, a cartel's
members must control a substantial proportion of current pro-
duction and exploitable reserves. They must face an inelastic
demand for their product and have effective means of price-fix-
ing and allocating market shares, and be able and willing to exert
significant control over the supply of the commodity reaching
the market. 37
No mineral countries have yet formed a cartel which meets
those criteria. In several cases "informal cooperation," price
leadership, or cartel-like activity are more appropriate descrip-
tions of actions taken by various producing countries to try to
influence the market in favor of their minerals. There are several
ways other than cartel action by which a group of producers may
attempt to influence a market. One means of attempting to
counter price declines or raise a price is by stockpiling and/or
production cutbacks. Copper countries have introduced cuts in
production, with only limited, if any, impact on prices. Some
producers have moved toward group action on export and price
policy for a particular commodity. The measures recommended
by the International Bauxite Association (IBA) are one example
of this approach. In other cases, the overall effect on the price
level might appear to result from concerted action whereas in-
formal consultations may have been sufficient. Actions taken by
several producers have also appeared to result from collusion
when actually there was none. A "follow the leader" pricing
policy, as in the case of phosphates in 1974, can give the impres-
sion that uniformity in price is a deliberate and concerted ob-
jective.
Although the three most advanced producer associations -
the Inter-governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries
(CIPEC), the International Bauxite Association (IBA), and the
Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries (AIEC) - are not
yet cartels in the formal sense, they have given serious considera-
tion to coordinated pricing policies. In November 1975, the
Ministerial Council of the IBA recommended that members
introduce a minimum pricing policy covering all bauxite exports
in 1976. The CIPEC has also announced that consideration
37 Hugh Corbet, Raw Materials: Beyond the Rhetoric of Commodity Power, Trade
Policy Research Centre (London), International Issues No. 1, at 10-11.
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will be given to ways to control prices, now that the membership
has been expanded to include Indonesia as a full member, and
Australia and Papua New Guinea as associate members.
The prospects for successful price actions by groups of pro-
ducing countries will be greatly influenced by the business cycle
in industrialized countries. Producer associations might very
well succeed in raising prices of their exports during a business
upturn. In response, consumers might switch to different min-
eral sources or substitutes through either concerted or individual
corporate responses; or governments of consuming countries
might intervene - through negotiation or threats of economic
retaliation. But these actions are not likely to deter producing
countries.
A primary objective of government-owned mining operations,
state trading agencies, or governments which successfully ex-
ercise control over price and quantities exported through levies
and stipulation of minimum levels of mine production is the
maximization of earnings from minerals and metals production
and trade. In this regard, their commercial objectives do not
differ substantially from those of private producing companies.
Thus the attempts by tin and copper countries in the slump of
1974-1975 to cut back production and exports were similar to those
instituted by some producing companies in industrialized nations.
For companies and countries alike, cutbacks may be preferable
to the increases in working capital that would be required to
finance the stocks that would accumulate if production was not
reduced in response to falling demand.38
Tin producing countries have successfully applied export con-
trols and producer restrictions within the framework of the Inter-
national Tin Agreement, but copper and bauxite countries are
still building toward the concerted decision-making ability that
would be necessary to hold a floor price for their products. 39
Some companies have shown a stronger degree of cohesion in
the face of adverse price movements than have groups of produc-
ing countries. No group of producing countries has yet shown a
capacity to exercise market control comparable to that exercised
by Western European zinc producing companies in 1975.
In spite of the similar commercial goals of private and gov-
ernmental producing and trading organizations, the presence of
38 Mikesell, supra note 36.
31 William Fox, Tin: The Working of a Commodity Agreement, Mining Journal
Book, Ltd. (1974).
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governments in developing countries' mineral industries intro-
duces significant differences between producing countries and
private corporations. Governments, particularly those of de-
veloping countries, face the political necessity of maintaining
employment as well as economic imperatives, such as assuring
adequate foreign exchange earnings and safeguarding their
balance of payments position. Moreover, since the financial
resources of a mineral-producing developing nation are liable to be
insufficient to stock significant quantities of its output, it will
have considerable incentives to maintain and export its produc-
tion, even if prices fall severely. These factors may weaken its
ability to participate effectively in a producer association which
is trying to limit price declines. However, governments can act
together without the constraints of possible antitrust actions which
apply to private corporations. Furthermore, their international
political objectives may be met by participating in a producer
association. For example, they may feel that concerted action
is necessary to establish a parity of negotiating strengths with
foreign interests. 40
Producers' associations also provide valuable information to
mineral-producing countries as well as political encouragement
to individual countries. The impact of such associations has been
very significant for their transmission of knowledge on mineral
arrangements and marketing in participating countries. In any
negotiation knowledge is power. Exchanging information within
producers' associations on contracts and sharing legal and tech-
nical knowhow has, therefore, complemented the already frequent
efforts by single nations to renegotiate their mineral arrange-
ments with foreign firms.
Present membership of the IBA, the CIPEC, and the AIEC
includes both developed and developing countries. Canada and
a number of other countries send observers to CIPEC meetings. 41
Australia's membership in these groups may moderate tendencies
toward cartelization since both recent Australian governments
have expressly ruled out cartel action on prices. However, with-
out actively engaging in cartel-like decisions, any producing
country could benefit from price rises resulting from decisions
by other members of producer associations to exercise price
40 For an exploration of this motive, see Franck and Chesler, "At Arms Length":
The Coming Law of Collective Bargaining in International Relations between Equili-
brated States, 15 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 579 (1975).
41 Observers at the Nov. 1975 OIPEC ministerial-level meeting were Bolivia,
Canada, the Philippines, Uganda, and Yugoslavia.
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leadership. If conditions are favorable to price rises, as during
the expansionary phase of the business cycle, all producing coun-
tries can be expected to attempt to obtain the maximum export
earnings possible. These attempts will probably coincide with
the price policies of private producing companies.
What are some of the implications of the possibility of suc-
cessful attempts by producer associations to raise non-fuel
mineral and metals prices? Higher prices for non-fuel minerals,
or for other raw materials, whether influenced by producer as-
sociations or not, do not benefit all developing countries. Con-
suming countries will face additional import costs if commodity
prices go up, just as they now face higher fuel, food, and fertilizer
costs. Within the group of developing countries, the gains from
pricing policies of producer associations, therefore, will be un-
evenly distributed. The membership of such groups does not
necessarily conform to areas of greatest poverty or need for
external resources. Nor is there any assurance that a shift of
ownership to governments or private interests in developing coun-
tries, or successful attempts to raise prices by producer associa-
tions will necessarily bring benefits to the poorest people within
producing countries. Moreover, the additional price rises intro-
duced by a producer group will probably complicate govern-
mental and private relations within the group of developed coun-
tries as competition for available supplies on "safe" sites for
minerals investments accelerates.
None of the above factors is likely to persuade a group of pro-
ducing nations that they should not attempt to increase to the
maximum extent feasible their earnings from minerals production
and export. We can therefore anticipate that producer associa-
tions or more informal groups of producing countries will try, at
a minimum, to raise prices during expansions of business activity
and to support floor prices during business downturns.
POLICY RESPONSES TO PRODUCER GROUPS
For developing countries endowed with raw materials, mutual
collaboration makes an essential contribution to strengthening
their bargaining power vis-a-vis the industrialized countries and
large corporations. Cooperation by exporters includes exchange
of information on prices, contractual arrangements for invest-
ments and sales transactions, and market information. Among
the developing countries, there are advocates of strong cartel
action as well as of more limited producer-country cooperation,
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but a duplication of the impact of the oil-exporter's action is
not likely in most mineral industries. Although most efforts
at cooperation among mineral countries will probably fall short
of cartelization, strictly defined, producing countries all share the
objective of increasing their returns from the production, process-
ing, and export of primary commodities. Australia's cooperation
with other bauxite and iron ore producers suggests that the in-
dustrialized countries will find that even countries once con-
sidered as "safe" sources of raw materials supplies will work with
other producers to seek greater and more stable earnings from
their exports.
Dealing with the new attitudes among raw material suppliers
may be the first step by the industrialized countries toward meet-
ing their commodity objectives. Taking that step will depend on
a reassessment of the generally hostile reactions to producing
country cooperation that have been common until now. Too
often, such an approach toward producer groupings appears to
start from the premise that cooperation among producing and
exporting countries must be prejudicial to developed country
interests. This need not be so, since one of the main objectives
of such groupings is likely to be collective bargaining - not
confrontation - with firms or governments of industrialized
countries on price, earnings, and such issues as technology trans-
fers.
The possibility of negotiating with producer associations or
cartels has won only gruding acceptance in the developed coun-
tries. It took two years following the initial OPEC oil price
rises to establish a consumer-producer forum on energy and
other issues, the Conference on International Economic Coopera-
tion. The initial responses of firms and governments of de-
veloped countries to other associations were defensive and po-
tentially retaliatory. Possible actions that have been considered
include concerted action by consuming countries, or by com-
panies, and official or private stockpiling of selected materials
to counter contrived shortages. Use of the economic - or even
military - power of industrial economies to force changes in
producing-country policies has also been actively discussed.42
Private Responses. In the negotiations with the Jamaican
Government following its introduction of the bauxite levies in
1974, aluminum companies apparently cooperated on issues of
42 N.Y. Times editorial and Business Wk., Interview with Kissinger, The
Developing World's Challenge in Perspective.
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common concern. Although this action by private companies
was undertaken with at least tacit U.S. Government permis-
sion,40 most private responses which attempted to deal collectively
with a price or production policy of a producer association would
be subject to challenge under the antitrust laws of industrialized
countries. Moreover, joint private efforts to deal with producer
associations face two obstacles: (1) Producer association policies
to raise prices are likely to be most effective during an economic
upswing, a time when private firms would also find it relatively
easy to make upward price adjustments and thus pass the price
increase to final consumers. Such a course might be preferable
to formal or informal industrial consultations leading to some
policies which might expose firms to antitrust measures; (2) In
an economic slump when producer association policies would
probably aim at cutting production and/or exports, individual or
groups of companies would have little prospect of overcoming
government controls if the latter were effectively applied.
Official Responses. Developed-country governments have
considered strategic stockpiling of critical materials, use of trade
policy measures such as export controls to influence producer
association policies, conservation, the search for substitute
sources through recycling and domestic exploration. In the United
States, and very likely in other countries as well, there is a
considerable fragmentation of government agencies dealing with
commodity issues. This lack of internal coordination has resulted
in inadequate monitoring of events and availability of critical
raw materials and in calls to improve commodity data systems. 44
The United States is the developed country with the largest
stockpiles of numerous raw materials, including many non-fuel
minerals. Other countries have begun to expand their own stock-
piles as well. 4s Japan and France are expanding their national
stockpiles for economic reasons. In 1975, France reportedly
allocated 250 million francs to the purchase of copper and nickel
as well as smaller purchases of zinc, lead, tin, molybdenum, and
precious metals. Japan recently announced an expanded stock-
piling policy. Purely national stockpiles might protect the
interests of individual countries but, unless their use was co-
43 D. A. Deloff, M. J. Frantz, and L. H. Richmond, Non-Fuel Mineral Car-
tels: United States Economic Policy and Changing Resource Patterns, 7 L. & POL. IN
INT'L Bus. 89-91 (1975).
44 Industry interviews.
4s U.S. Bureau of Mines, Dept. Int., Commodity Data Summaries, Washington,
D.C., 1975, GPO passim.
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ordinated, they would probably not ensure that effective down-
ward pressure was put on a price set by a producer association.
In general, stockpiles must be very large indeed if they are to have
an impact on price trends which reflect fundamental business
cycle conditions.
Retaliation through use of critical materials produced in
developed countries, such as food, or through controls of exports
of needed manufactured goods to the members of a producer
association is of questionable value as a tool of economic policy. 46
Usually, alternate sources of food or other goods are available to
importing countries and the main impact on other countries'
policies of such measures may well be to strengthen their
resolve to maintain the policy. Moreover, effective use of the
economic power of developed countries would require a degree
of coordination among them which would be very difficult to
achieve, given their varying interests in areas of the world which
produce non-fuel minerals and their differing degrees of import
dependency.
The final and probably most fruitful approach to producer
associations is one which would recognize their existence and
seek a means to negotiate satisfactory resolution of potential
disputes between producers and consumers. (In such negotia-
tions, the hand of consuming countries could of course be
strengthened by the presence of national economic stockpiles of
certain products.) This approach now has a precedent in the
initial meetings of the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation. Producer/consumer forums for key commodities offer
one means of beginning a cooperative dialogue between producer
or exporter associations and consuming countries. At this writing,
talks are underway which are expected to lead to the formation
of such a forum for copper. Such organizations would not
supplant producer groups, since producer group members are not
likely to welcome consuming countries into their discussions of
ways to better their bargaining positions, but they could, if
properly managed, lead to effective bargaining and compromises
by both sides on international commodity policies.
46 See Rothschild, Food Politics, 54 FoR. AFF. 285 (1976).
1976]
